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INTRODUCTION 
It is unfortunate that counsel for the McLaughlins has 
chosen the Respondent's Brief as a forum for making defamatory 
allegations which are either (1) disputed by Mr. Perry as shown 
in the Record, (2) contrary to the undisputed facts in the 
Record, or (3) wholly without support in the Record. Mr. Perry 
is a caring and loving grandfather to his daughter's two sons, 
Shaun and Dustin, and has throughout these proceedings acted in 
their best interests. However, Mr. Perry is not under a duty 
to act for the benefit of his deceased daughter's ex-husband 
and his new wife. The underlying dispute in this case is 
between Mr. Perry and his ex-son in law and wife — not between 
Mr. Perry and his two grandsons. 
Rather than clutter the Reply Brief with irrelevant and 
unnecessary detail, but in order to inform the Court fully of 
the manner in which counsel for the McLaughlins has distorted 
the facts in the Record before the Court, Mr. Perry has 
provided an appendix to this Reply Brief. In addition to 
allegations disputed as part of the argument section, the 
appendix sets forth other erroneous allegations contained in 
the McLaughlins' Respondent's Brief and provides Mr. Perry's 
response. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I. THE KEY ISSUE IS WHETHER THE MCLAUGHLINS WERE 
INTERESTED PERSONS FOR PURPOSES OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH HEARING 
The McLaughlins argue summarily that Subsection 75-1-302(2) 
gave the probate court power to enter an order granting 
affirmative relief to the McLaughlins even though they are not 
interested persons. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978). 
Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8. That Subsection provides: 
(2) The court has full power to make orders, 
judgments, and decrees and take all other action 
necessary and proper to administer justice in the 
matters that come before it. 
Id.; emphasis added. The McLaughlins have overlooked the 
importance of the underlined words. The probate court must 
have jurisdiction to hear a matter or that matter cannot "come 
before it." As the Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-1-106 
succinctly states: "When resort to the judge is necessary or 
desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain protection, the scope 
of the proceeding if not otherwise prescribed by the Code is 
framed by the petition." See generally, discussion in 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-24. Mr. Perry's petition requested 
that the court approve the sale to the Arnauds. He did not ask 
the court to enter an order selling the property to the 
McLaughlins. 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that 
the probate court does not have jurisdiction to grant 
affirmative relief to a non interested person. Matter of 
Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1986). In order to 
succeed on this appeal, the McLaughlins must establish that 
they were both interested persons. Unless they can do this, 
the probate court was without jurisdictional authority to grant 
them affirmative relief. See, Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-18. 
ii. THE MCLAUGHLINS HAVE IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MRS. 
MCLAUGHLIN WAS NOT AN INTERESTED PERSON 
The McLaughlins1 Respondent's Brief speaks at length to the 
question of whether Kent McLaughlin is an interested person. 
See generally, Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-15. However, there 
is not one single reference to Carol McLaughlin and any claim 
she may have to be an interested person. This simply reflects 
the fact that Carol McLaughlin does not qualify as an 
interested person under any part of the definition. Utah Code 
Ann, § 75-1-201(20) (1978). 
Mrs. McLaughlin moved the probate court for and was granted 
affirmative relief at the hearing on November 6, 1985. 
(R.378). The probate court's order of December 3, 1985, which 
Mr. Perry attacks as being void, states in part: 
- 3 -
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(T)he former spouse of the decedent and his spouse, 
Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin, were present in person 
and represented by their attorney, E.H. Fankhauser; 
and the Court . . . called for higher and better bids; 
and Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin, having submitted to 
the Court their offer to purchase the real property 
and the furnishings . . . IT IS HEREBY ORDERED . . . . 
The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin 
to purchase the real property . . . is approved . . 
The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol 
McLaughlin to purchase personal property . . . is 
approved . . . . 
(R.77-78); see also (R.378:18-22). Thus, Mrs. McLaughlin was 
an integral part of the offer and was granted affirmative 
relief by the probate court. As explained in Mr. Perry's 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-18, the probate court lacked 
jurisdictional authority to grant Mrs McLaughlin affirmative 
relief. Its order granting affirmative relief is thus void and 
should be vacated. 
in. KENT MCLAUGHLIN WAS NOT AN INTERESTED PERSON FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH HEARING 
The McLaughlins suggest that the probate court made a 
finding of fact that Kent McLaughlin was an "interested 
person." Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12. The McLaughlins 
further argue that the probate court's alleged finding can only 
be set aside if an abuse of discretion is shown. Respondent's 
- 4 -
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Brief, p.12. The probate court never made a finding of fact 
that Mr. McLaughlin was an interested person. See the court's 
orders of December 3, 1985 (R.77-81), of March 12, 1986 
(R.190-192) and of July 9, 1986 (R.293-294). Moreover, the 
correct standard for reviewing a finding of fact by the trial 
court is not abuse of discretion; it is whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
finding, the evidence is insufficient to support the finding. 
Scharf v. BGM Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
The McLaughlins Now Argue They Appeared As Fiduciaries 
For Shaun and Dustin 
Mr. Perry's Appellant's Brief already addresses and 
disposes of the argument that Kent McLaughlin's $2,500 
equitable interest in Diane's home provided a sufficient 
interest to permit him to bid on Diane's home and furnishings 
at the November 6, 1985 hearing. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 
15-16. The McLaughlins now argue that Kent McLaughlin was also 
an interested person because he appeared at the November 6, 
1985 hearing as the natural guardian of, and thus a fiduciary 
on behalf of, Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin, Diane's sole heirs 
under Utah law. Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-15. The Record 
does not support this allegation. 
- 5 -
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The McLaughlins Did Not Advise The Court They 
Were Appearing As Fiduciaries 
When, the matter was called, the McLaughlins, through their 
counsel, offerred to purchase the real and personal property. 
Counsel for the McLaughlins argued that the probate court 
should accept the McLaughlins' offer solely on the basis that 
it was a better offer for the estate. (R.371-373). At the end 
of the hearing, counsel for the McLaughlins represented to the 
court that Mr. McLaughlin would purchase the personal property 
and give it to Shaun and Dustin. (R.383). But when counsel 
for the McLaughlins prepared his proposed order, there were no 
representations that the McLaughlins were acting in a fiduciary 
capacity nor were there any restrictions on the McLaughlins' 
use of the property once purchased. (R.72-75). Under the 
order prepared by their counsel, the McLaughlins became 
absolute owners of the property and were free to use it for 
their benefit as they saw fit. 
The McLaughlins Did Not Argue This Position 
When The Issue Was Raised With The Probate Court 
Moreover, the McLaughlins did not make this allegation when 
Mr. Perry raised the issue with the probate court. When Mr. 
- 6 -
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Perry filed his Rule 59 motion, the central issue in that 
motion was whether the McLaughlins were "interested persons." 
(R.200-201, 283-288). Counsel for the McLaughlins filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Mr. Perry's Rule 59 motion, 
(R.253-261), and he also argued against Mr. Perry's Rule 59 
motion at the hearing before Judge Hanson. (R.388-413). 
Counsel for the McLaughlins argued at length that Kent 
McLaughlin was an interested person. (R.256-258, 398-402). 
However, the only basis argued to the probate court was that 
Mr. McLaughlin had an equitable interest in Diane's home. 
There is not one single reference in either the memorandum or 
the oral argument to the allegation Mr. McLaughlin now makes 
that he was representing the interests of Shaun and Dustin as 
their natural guardian. 
Mr. McLaughlin Acted Contrary To The Interests 
Of His Sons By Demanding Payment Of His Equitable Lien 
Finally, while Mr. McLaughlin now characterizes his 
attendance at the November 6th hearing as an effort to protect 
his sons' interests, the only action taken by Mr. McLaughlin 
prior to the hearing was contrary to the interests of his 
sons. Mr. McLaughlin objected to Mr. Perry's petition in 
writing — not on the grounds that the home and furnishings 
- 7 -
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were being sold to a third party — but rather on the grounds 
that Mr. McLaughlin would not waive his $2,500 equitable lien 
in Diane's home. (R.55-56). When the home was sold to the 
Arnauds in December, 1985, Mr. McLaughlin collected the entire 
amount of his equitable interest. (R.241). Had Mr. McLaughlin 
waived his lien in the home as he had once stated he would, his 
sons -- the only beneficiaries of the estate — would have been 
enriched by $2,500.00. Instead, Mr. McLaughlin demanded full 
payment of the equitable interest contrary to the interests of 
his sons — the persons he now claims he appeared in court to 
protect. (R.14). 
Thus, the Record shows that the McLaughlins were acting in 
their individual capacities, for their own interest, and not as 
fiduciaries for Shaun and Dustin. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since neither of the McLaughlins are interested persons, 
the probate court exceeded its jurisdictional authority when it 
granted affirmative relief to them pursuant to the December 3, 
1985 Order. An order entered in excess of the probate court's 
jurisdictional authority is void. When a party petitions the 
court to vacate a void order under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure (1985), the court must vacate the 
- 8 -
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order if it is void. The probate court erred when it refused 
to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order. Mr. Perry respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the probate court's order of 
March 12, 1986 refusing to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order 
and remand the case to the probate court with instructions to 
vacate the December 3, 1985 Order. 
Dated this j? day of N^Z^ , 1987, 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
(^CW^ H^f^i^jf 
Chltrles M. Benn^t 
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry, 
Personal Representative of the 
Estate 
- 9 -
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APPENDIX 
Unfounded and Incorrect Allegations of the McLaughlins 
and Mr. Perry's Response. 
1. Mr. Perry said that he would sell Diane's home. 
a. The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry told Kent 
McLaughlin he would not sell either Diane's home or the 
personal property in the home. They also allege that Mr. Perry 
promised Shaun and Dustin he would not sell the furniture and 
personal property. Respondent's Brief, p.3. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that he never told Mr. 
McLaughlin that he would not sell the home and the 
furnishings. In fact, Mr. Perry petitioned the court for 
approval of the sale and Mr. McLaughlin's waiver of his 
equitable lien on the house and sent notice to Mr. McLaughlin. 
(R.44). While there have been many references to Mr. 
McLaughlin's oral waiver of his equitable lien by his counsel 
(see, e.g., R.398), Mr. McLaughlin has never disputed that a 
conversation took place with Mr. Perry concerning the waiver of 
his lien. If Mr. Perry told Mr. McLaughlin that Mr. Perry 
would not sell the home, there would have been no need for Mr. 
Perry to discuss with Mr. McLaughlin the waiver of Mr. 
McLaughlin's lien. 
- 10 -
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Mr. Perry did not tell Shaun and Dustin he would not 
sell the home and furnishings. Rather, he expressly told them 
that he was selling the home and furniture. Before selling the 
home, he made at least two formal tours of the home with Shaun 
and Dustin and made sure that they received all of the personal 
property items in the house they wanted or needed. (R.230). 
2. The McLaughlins appeared at the November 6th hearing 
in their individual capacities 
a. The McLaughlins allege that Mr. McLaughlin 
appeared at the November 6, 1985 hearing as the natural 
guardian of and a fiduciary for Shaun and Dustin. Respondent's 
Brief, p.13. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that there is no support in 
the Record for this allegation. In addition to the facts set 
forth in Point III above, the court should note: 
1) When Mr. McLaughlin was divorced from Diane, 
the court ordered him to pay Diane $300.00 per month 
in child support for the benefit of Shaun and Dustin. 
(R.51). Mr. McLaughlin was consistently delinquent in 
his child support obligations. As of January 10, 
1984, Mr. McLaughlin owed Diane $5,800.00 in past due 
child support payments, $1,600.00 of which was owed 
pursuant to a judgment entered on May 7, 1981. (R.50). 
- 11 -
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2) In order to obtain the benefit of the 
court's award of child support to her, Diane executed 
an agreement with Mr. McLaughlin on January 10, 1984. 
(R.50-53). The agreement provided that Diane would 
purchase Mr. McLaughlin's equitable lien in Diane's 
home for a total price of $13,380.00. Diane was 
credited with the $5,800.00 in past due child support 
against the purchase price. It was agreed that Diane 
would "pay" for the remaining $7,580.00 by waiving 
future child support at the rate of $300 per month. 
(R.50). Thus, by the time of Diane's death, Mr. 
McLaughlin's equitable lien had been reduced to 
approximately $2,500. 
3. Mr. Perry required the McLaughlins to abide by the 
Court's order in purchasing Diane's home. 
a. The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry 
intentionally frustrated their efforts to purchase the home and 
imply that this was the reason the McLaughlins were unable to 
purchase the home. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that on December 6, 1985, 
counsel for Mr. Perry learned that the McLaughlins intended to 
purchase Diane's home without formally assuming the underlying 
- 12 -
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mortgage. (R. 238-239). The net effect of the McLaughlins' 
plan would have been that the estate would no longer have owned 
the home, but the estate would have remained liable on the 
mortgage. (R.239). That obviously was not the "better" offer 
that the McLaughlins represented to the probate court that they 
were making. (R. 371-373). Moreover, the McLaughlins' plan 
violated the express terms of paragraph 3b of the Court's 
December 3, 1985 Order: "Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol 
McLaughlin are to pay the personal representative . . . as 
follows: $18,500 representing the approximate balance of an 
existing mortgage to be assumed by the [McLaughlins]. (R.79; 
emphasis added). The sole reason the McLaughlins were unable 
to purchase the home was because Mr. Perry insisted that they 
do so in accordance with the Court's Order. (R.239). 
4. The Court ordered Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin to purchase 
the property; the McLaughlins violated the Court's Order 
a. The McLaughlins allege that the Court's Order of 
December 3, 1985 required Mr. Perry to sell the property to Mr. 
McLaughlin. Respondent's Brief, p.10. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that, in addition to the 
points made above, the McLaughlins misstate the Record when 
they say that the Court ordered a sale to Mr. McLaughlin. The 
- 13 -
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Order required Mr. and Mrs. McLaughlin to purchase the home and 
furnishings by December 1, 1985. The order was unconditional. 
It did not contemplate or provide for any disposition of the 
property in the event the McLaughlins violated the order by 
attempting to purchase only the furnishings and failing to 
purchase the home. (R.77-81). 
5. The McLaughlins did not object to a sale of the home 
and furnishings to third parties. 
a. The McLaughlins allege that at a meeting 
following the hearing on Mr. Perry's petition to sell the home 
(approximately November 6, 1985), they advised Mr. Perry that 
Shaun, Dustin and the McLaughlins did not want the home and 
furnishings sold to a third party. Respondent's Brief, p.5. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that the McLaughlins made no 
such statements at the meeting. In addition to Mr. 
McLaughlin's oral waiver of his equitable interest (see 
paragraph 1 above), this is shown by what took place after that 
meeting. 
After this meeting, counsel for the McLaughlins 
prepared a proposed order, and Mr. Perry objected to the order 
and filed his own order and a memorandum in support of that 
order. (R. 66-71). A copy of Mr. Perry's order and memorandum 
- 14 -
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was mailed to counsel for the McLaughlins on November 27, 
1985. (R.82). In the memorandum, counsel for Mr. Perry argued 
that the court's order should not reserve jurisdiction of the 
case if the McLaughlins failed to close on the property on or 
before December 1, 1985, as ordered. (R.68). Furthermore, the 
memorandum stated: "If the McLaughlins are not able to close 
on or before December 1, 1985, the Personal Representative [Mr. 
Perry] will sell the property to the Arnauds." (R.69; emphasis 
added). Notwithstanding this unequivocable statement and the 
McLaughlins alleged opposition to the sale of the home and 
furnishings to third parties, the McLaughlins neither objected 
to nor made any efforts to stop the sale to the Arnauds until 
after the sale was completed. (R.122-123, 126-127). Counsel 
for the McLaughlins filed an ex parte motion for and an order 
to show cause on December 24, 1985. (R.122-123, 126-127). 
Counsel for the McLaughlins avers that he was told on December 
9, 1985 that the furniture and home would be sold to the 
Arnauds and that he learned the sale was completed on December 
13, 1985. (R.171-172). 
6. The property sold to the Arnauds was not 
"sentimental"; Shaun and Dustin took from their mother's home 
the property they wanted 
- 15 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a. The McLaughlins allege that "Shaun and Dustin 
wanted the home and furniture to remain in the family for 
sentimental reasons . . . ." Respondent's Brief, p.9. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that if the McLaughlins 
appeared at the November 6th hearing for the purpose of 
preserving the home and furniture for Shaun and Dustin and 
protecting their sentiments, why did they not disclose that to 
the court? Indeed, rather than bidding for the property, the 
McLaughlins could have simply objected to any sale under any 
circumstances. If no sale had occurred, the home and 
furnishings would have ultimately been distributed to the 
conservator for the benefit of Shaun and Dustin. An objection 
to the sale of the home and furnishings on the basis that the 
beneficiaries wanted the property would have been granted as a 
matter of course. 
Moreover, the Court should review the list of 
furnishings that were sold. (R.54). It included such 
sentimental memorabilia as "1 portable dishwasher, 1 end table, 
1 large lamp, 1 washer, 1 dryer, various metal braces, [and] 
wood shelving." (R.54). Mr. Perry suggests that the real 
reason behind the McLaughlins efforts to secure the furnishings 
for themselves (while not closing on the home) was their 
recognition that the price placed on the furnishings was 
artificially low. (R.263). 
- 16 -
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The Arnauds originally made a single offer to 
purchase the home and furnishings together. Counsel for Mr. 
Perry advised the Arnauds to resubmit their offer and to place 
a separate value on the home and a separate value on the 
furnishings. The price for the furnishings was set without an 
appraisal as an accomodation to the Arnauds in obtaining FHA 
financing for the purchase of the home. (R.105-106). Since 
the Arnauds could not borrow money from the FHA to purchase the 
furniture, they naturally set the price of the furniture as low 
as possible. 
Finally, Mr. Perry took Shaun and Dustin through the home 
on at least two formal occasions. They took everything they 
wanted or needed. (R.230). 
7. Judge Hanson followed the procedure set forth in the 
repealed probate code section at the November 6th hearing 
a. The McLaughlins allege that Judge Hanson was 
concerned for the estate and the interested parties at the 
hearing held on November 6, 1985, and that his decision to 
allow Mr. McLaughlin to bid as an interested person was founded 
on these concerns. Respondent's Brief, p.12. 
b. Mr. Perry responds that Judge Hanson's only 
concern was with the issue of which offer was "better", and he 
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had no concern for the parties making the offers. When Mr. 
Perry requested that the McLaughlins be required to pay a 
larger down payment than the Arnauds had made, Judge Hanson 
responded: 
No. I think the money is appropriate. I don't know 
the Arnauds any more than I know the McLaughlins. I 
have no reason to think that either would not 
perform. The better bid, and equal in dollars, equal 
in initial offer comes from the McLaughlins, and they 
can close in the same time proposed. 
(R.381). Judge Hanson viewed his responsibilities solely in 
terms of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; 
repealed 1983) — to determine which was the higher and better 
bid. There was no discussion at the hearing of whether Mr. 
McLaughlin or his wife were interested persons. (See, 
R.369-388). 
8. Mr. Perry has not breached his duties deliberately or 
otherwise. 
a. The McLaughlins allege that Mr. Perry 
deliberately breached his fiduciary duties and disregarded a 
order of the Court by selling the home and furnishings to the 
Arnauds. Respondent's Brief, pp.10, 14. 
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b. Mr. Perry responds that he does not believe that 
he violated the probate court's order of December 3, 1985. The 
order itself refers 6 times to a single "offer to purchase the 
real property and the furnishings", not a separate offer to 
purchase the real property and a separate offer to purchase the 
personal property. (R.78) Mr. Perry acted only after 
receiving advice from counsel that he was free to sell to the 
Arnauds in view of the McLaughlins' undisputable violation of 
the December 3, 1985 Order (they failed to close on the home by 
December 1, 1985 as ordered to do). (R.233). Even if it is 
ultimately determined that Mr. Perry violated the December 3, 
1985 Order, he certainly was not "deliberate[ly] breach[ing] 
[his] trust" (Respondent's Brief, p.10) nor was he 
"disregard[ing] the lawful order of the court" (Respondent's 
Brief, p.14). See also, R.205-213 (Mr. Perry's memorandum in 
support of his petition to quash the order to show cause which 
sets forth his defense to the claim he breached the order). 
9. There have been no extra expenses in the Delta lawsuit 
a. The McLaughlins allege that counsel for Mr. Perry 
has caused added expenses to the estate by pursuing duplicative 
lawsuits against Delta Air Lines. Respondent's Brief, pp.3-4. 
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b. Mr. Perry responds that there have been no added 
expenses. Originally, one lawsuit (and one complaint) was 
filed against Delta Air Lines. The conservator for Shaun and 
Dustin asserted the survival claims and the personal 
representative of the estate asserted the wrongful death 
claims. See In Re Delta Air Crash, August 2, 1985, MDL 657, 
United States District Court, Northern District in Fort Worth, 
Texas. The contingency agreement operates against the entire 
recovery. (R.28-31). The total expenses would be identical if 
either the conservator or the personal representative had 
asserted all of the claims against Delta. Moreover, Mr. Perry 
petitioned the probate court for approval of the agreement. 
(R.24-32). Notice of this hearing was sent to Mr. McLaughlin's 
home (R.22-backside of page), and he neither appeared at the 
hearing or objected to the granting of the petition. (R.63). 
CDN5026B 
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